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Abstract. In December 201o, Rodney Knight Jr. broke into
Washington Post columnist Marc Fisher's Washington D.C.
home, stealing two laptops, a winter coat, and cash. Proud
of his heist, Knight uploaded pictures of himself and his loot
onto Facebook using one of his newly pilfered computers. In
an even more audacious move, Knight posted a picture of
himself with a handful of the stolen cash on the victim's
Facebook page. The Assistant United States Attorney
General on the case, also adept at using the Internet,
utilized the information to obtain a warrant and arrested
Knight within a month. In the face of such evidence against
him, Knight pled guilty. While this may seem like an
extreme example, the use of information from Facebook and
other social media sites is becoming an important part of
police investigations and both criminal and civil litigation.
Due to the popularity and prevalence of social media, there
is a multitude of information stored online and on third
party servers. Users of social media have become
accustomed to posting information depicting every minute
detail of their lives, allowing friends and families to
communicate easily and often. Status updates, personal
information, and photographs loaded onto social media
websites have become important sources of discovery in
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litigation, as these sources make it easier and cheaper to
obtain information than ever before. However, courtroom
use of information from Facebook and other popular
websites often happens largely unbeknownst to users. While
E-discovery is an important tool for litigators, what
privacy interests are we giving up for the use of this
information? This Note addresses the current state of
privacy law concerning electronic communications, E-
evidence use, and what steps should be taken to protect
users'privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the wonders of social media, socialization and
networking have evolved irrevocably.' With Facebook's active user
base of more than 8oo million,2 the world is now connected and
sharing information like never before. From constant status updates
to photographs, users post and share information about their personal
lives, often without considering any repercussions of such uploads.
Law enforcement officials and legal professionals, realizing the value
of such highly personal information on Facebook, have increasingly
attempted to use such information as evidence at trial.3 In 2010, a
New York court ruled private information taken from a plaintiffs
social networking site to be admissible because of its material and
necessary nature, broadening previous standards of admissibility.4
But should information gathered from social media be discoverable
and admissible in the courtroom?
This Note examines the current legal landscape concerning the use
of E-evidence from social media and the privacy and policy concerns
that arise with such use. Part II of this Note gives a brief overview of
social networking media and its effect on the law and current legal
discourse. Part III reviews the most common types of cases that have
seen admission of evidence from social media and recent cases dealing
with the admission of such evidence. Part IV looks at prevailing
1 RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES
77 (2010).
2Facebook Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics last
visited Feb. 1, 2012). Additionally, half of these active users log on every day. Id.
3 Andrew C. Payne, Note, Twitigation: Old Rules in a New World, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 841,
845 (2010).
4 Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
692 [Vol. 7:3
GLADYSZ
privacy doctrines and the levels of privacy that govern current policy
considerations, applying these levels to Facebook content. Finally,
Part V examines the future of social media in the courtroom and
argues for stricter standards of admissibility and user protection.
II. WELCOME TO THE CYBERWORLD
From humble beginnings at Harvard University in 2004, Facebook
first expanded to other colleges, then eventually to anyone with an
email address and a desire to socialize online.5 Facebook's ever-
evolving nature calls into question what reasonable expectations of
privacy users have had at various points in its existence. What users
may have considered quite private during Facebook's first years may
no longer be seen as secure. Likewise, once information is uploaded, it
is stored on Facebook's servers indefinitely, even when it is removed
from the actual website. 6 Because of the expansion in the user base-
from American college and university students to anyone in the world
with Internet access-and the numerous changes in the interface,
what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy is truly a good
question. It is thus useful to examine the current statutory scheme
regarding electronic communications, including social networking
media.
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects the rights of United States
citizens to be secure from "unreasonable searches and seizures."7 But
what qualifies as "reasonable" when it comes to social media remains
5 Facebook Company Timeline, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
6 Bill Meyer, Facebook Data-retention Changes Spark Protest, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 17,
2009, 3:25 P.M.), http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2009/02/
facebook dataretention changes.html; see also FACEBOOK DATA USE POLICY,
http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#deleting (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). If
a user does delete his profile with potentially admissible evidence, Facebook will restore
access if it is possible. DIGITAL FORENSICS & EDISCOVERY ADVISORY - FACEBOOK
SUBPOENAS,CONTINUUM WORLDWIDE LEGAL SOLUTIONS (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.continuumww.com/Libraries/PDFs/DF eD lol3lo.sflb.ashx. Additionally,
Facebook does urge users to use other means to obtain information if possible. Id.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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an open question.8 As Justice Rehnquist stated in United States v.
Knights:
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree
to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 9
This balancing act often necessarily places individual interests at odds
with those of the judicial system. Individuals want to protect their
information from outside intrusion, but such information is at times
essential to the promotion of justice. The current test for
reasonableness, established in Katz v. United States and explored
further in Part III of this Note, contains both subjective and objective
components.10 As a result, there are no easy answers as to what is
reasonable-especially given the rapidly evolving nature of today's
Web.
The Supreme Court has said that the Fourth Amendment "protects
people, not places."11 Though the Framers of the Constitution had no
way of predicting the technological advances that have developed
since America's birth, their ultimate intention was to protect
individual liberties from unreasonable government interference.12 The
recognition of this intention has resulted in the broad interpretation
(and reinterpretation) of the language of the Fourth Amendment with
the advent of technological and social advances, which is necessary in
order to develop the scope of the protections inherent in the
Amendment.13
8 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 6o STAN. L. REV. 503,
504-05 (2007).
9 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
lo Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (2004) (Harlan, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 351.
12 Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 352-53
(2009).
13 Id. As highlighted in Scolnik's article, even Originalist Justice Antonin Scalia commented
in Kyllo v. United States, "It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured
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Simply put, the Fourth Amendment limits government intrusion
into private individuals' lives. 14 Despite this, there have been countless
instances where courts found other legitimate government interests
that outweighed Fourth Amendment privacy protections. In Katz v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
must be construed based on what the writers of the Constitution
considered "unreasonable search and seizure" and does not absolutely
shield an individual's privacy from investigation.15 Under this
Originalist perspective, the Fourth Amendment does not apply as
strongly to electronic information, which exists outside of the home,
as it does to physical objects contained in the home, such as papers or
other items.16 Additionally, because of the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test and concerns about overreaching government intrusions,
especially those pertaining to emerging technologies, Congress began
promulgating statutes defining reasonable expectations of privacy as
applied to specific items and places, leading to the first wiretapping
laws and other related statutes.17
In defining the limits of the Fourth Amendment, the legislature
and courts have struggled with balancing an individual's privacy
concerns with the compelling need for information. Recent years have
seen the ratification of the Patriot Act and Freedom of Information
Act, which have reframed some privacy rights and invoked the
compulsory release of stored information at both the federal and state
level.' 8 Such statutes have allowed law enforcement greater use of
surveillance mechanisms, especially by electronic means, and have
bypassed some of the statutory protections in place.
to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (20Ol). A staunch Originalist,
Scalia nevertheless observed the dangers inherent if the Fourth Amendment was not
construed in a flexible manner. Such flexible interpretation would thus ensure
"preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted." Id. at 34.
14 Nicholas Matlach, Comment, Who Let the Katz Out? How the ECPA and SCA Fail to
Apply to Modern Digital Communications and How Returning to the Principles in Katz v.
United States Will Fix It, 18 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 421, 422 (2010).
15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
16 Sarah Salter, Storage and Privacy in the Cloud: Enduring Access to Ephemeral
Messages, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 365, 370-71 (2010).
17 Matlach, supra note 14, at 424-26.
,8 Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 311 (2011); see also
Salter, supra note 16, at 372.
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B. THE 2006 E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS
Due to the rapid development and evolution of technology,
Congress and state legislatures have had a difficult time keeping up
with promulgating changes in the law, often leaving courts to
construct new common law through their jurisprudence.19 Despite the
difficulties inherent in enacting and amending laws to keep pace with
new information technologies, there have been several advances.
In 2oo6, the E-discovery amendments were added to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, creating distinctions between paper and
electronic documents.2° Before the adoption of formal rules governing
E-discovery, courts generally admitted any relevant computerized
evidence.21 However, as technology progressed and the admission of
E-evidence became litigated more often, the courts and Congress
came to a consensus that "digital is different" and began looking at
revisions to the existing statutes. 22 An amendment to Rule 34 added
the term "electronically stored information" to the types of documents
that may be requested23 and specified procedures for requesting
electronically stored information.24 The Advisory Committee defined
"electronically stored information" rather broadly, including
information "'stored in any medium' to encompass future
developments in computer technology. '"25
The Committee also made changes to Rule 26's duty to disclose,
creating "specific limitations on electronically stored information. '"26
Under the new two-tiered approach: (1) parties must disclose
information if it is at no undue burden or cost (by request or court
order) and; (2) the court may yet order discovery if it finds good
19 Payne, supra note 3, at 850. As one scholar humorously observed: "Modern
communication follows Moore's law: technology grows exponentially. Congress follows the
turtle law: slow and steady wins the race." Matlach, supra note 14, at 457.
20 Payne, supra note 3, at 856.
21 Id. at 851.
22 Id.
23 FED. R. CIv. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)-(2).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note (2006 amendment).
26 FED. R. CIv. P. 26Cb)(2)(B).
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cause-even if showing undue burden or cost is made.27 These moves
by the legislature, while seemingly minor in nature, indicate a
congressional stance toward disclosure, rather than disallowance, of
electronic information.
C. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
With the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),
Congress sought to extend the protections of wiretapping laws
specifically to new forms of electronic communications.28 While the
act is primarily aimed toward electronic communications, the
language of the act recognizes that the legislation's goal is to protect
the "sanctity and privacy of the communication."29 Despite Congress's
goal of extending greater protections to emerging technologies, the
courts have often held that little constitutional protection from the
prevailing Fourth Amendment shield is allotted to communications
that are open to the public.3O In these rulings, the courts often cite the
absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy when stating that the
communications lack Fourth Amendment protection. This is where
electronic surveillance law steps in: legislation, such as the ECPA,
operates independently of the Fourth Amendment.31 Because of this,
even if a search is deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
these laws can work to bar such evidence (and vice versa).32
The ECPA is the progeny of the Communications Act of 1934,
which authorized the Federal Communications Commission to
regulate common carriers, such as telephone companies and
prohibited the unlawful interception of voice communications without
the user's consent. 33 In United States v. Rathbun, the Supreme Court
27 Id.
28 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006).
29 132 Cong. Rec. 14, 886 (1986) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
30 See, e.g., Freedman v. Am. Online, 412 F.Supp. 2d 174, 181 (D. Conn. 2005); United
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d
173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004).
31 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 303 (3d ed. 2009).
32 Id.
33 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103-04 (1934); see
also Matlach, supra note 14, at 426 (examining Congress's policies in enacting the
Communications Act of 1934).
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ruled that only one party to a telephone conversation needs to consent
for interception of the conversation to be lawful under the
Communications Act.34 However, unlike the Stored Communications
Act (discussed below), the complicated definitions and additional
statutory requirements make obtaining warrants under the ECPA
extremely difficult.35 Described as a "'super' warrant,"36 law
enforcement officers must submit a warrant request containing sworn
statements and the specific nature and location of the
communications sought to justify the interception.37
The ECPA is only marginally applicable to social networks because
of the limited types of communications it governs. The ECPA applies
to any person who "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire, oral, or electronic communication."38 As such, the ECPA only
applies to communications in transmission-from the moment the
communication is sent until it is opened-but does not apply to
communications that have already been delivered to the recipient or
that are "stored communications."39 Communications governed by the
ECPA are subject to stringent standards of discoverability, while
communications that have already been delivered to the recipient are
governed by the Stored Communications Act, as explored below.
D. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The Stored Communications Act (SCA), which governs social
media such as Facebook and e-mail communications, prohibits
entities such as Facebook and MySpace from disclosing personal
information to the government without the account owner's consent.40
While the SCA was generally intended to cover email, text messages,
34 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 111 (1957).
35 Matlach, supra note 14, at 443.
36 Salter, supra note 16, at 373.
37 Id.
38 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
39 Matlach, supra note 14, at 448-49.
40 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
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and online bulletin boards,41 it arguably also applies to
communications on Facebook because such communications are
stored on Facebook's servers (though the courts have yet to rule on
this application definitively).42 The SCA was designed to balance the
government's legitimate interest in gaining access to information with
the privacy rights of individuals who have entrusted their
communications to Internet service providers.43 Despite this
protection, courtrooms are admitting such social media evidence
largely unbeknownst to the user base and with consequences that
remain to be seen.
Enacted in 1986, the Stored Communications Act was designed by
Congress to create a zone of privacy, protecting Internet users'
personal information while balancing the countervailing need for
access to that information.44 This "Fourth Amendment Lite" was
created to bridge the gap in the Fourth Amendment created by new
technologies, ensuring the continued vitality of the Amendment, and
to protect against the erosion of privacy rights.45 In enacting the SCA,
Congress had two main goals: to prohibit Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) from voluntarily releasing stored information and to ensure
that law enforcement officials have a vehicle by which to access stored
communications if such communications were reasonably necessary
to protect litigants from injustice.46 To carry out these goals, Congress
41 Timothy G. Ackermann, Consent and Discovery Under the Stored Communications Act,
FED. LAW. 42, 43 (2009).
42 Payne, supra note 3, at 848. There has been one court order applying the SCA to social
media E-evidence, where the subpoena was to the websites themselves. Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2010). The Crispin court held that
Facebook and other social media sites were electronic communications services, and
therefore subpoenas to these sites for private messages could be quashed. Id. at 991. The
SCA does not apply, however, where the subpoena is for wall posts or other "public"
messages. Id. at 990. As explained in this section, it also does not apply if the subpoena is
to an individual, whether a party or non-party, as the SCA only governs communications
service providers. Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, *11-12 (Pa. Com. P1.
2011) (Trial Order).
43 Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet
Communications Under the Stored Communications Act: It's Not a Level Playing Field, 97
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 569, 569 (2007).
44 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712; see also Ackermann, supra note 41, at 42.
45 Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 43, at 575-76.
46 Id. at 576.
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enacted a categorical ban on ISPs voluntarily releasing information, as
well as a series of exceptions, found in 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which enable
law enforcement officials to seek disclosure through a precise
process. 4 7
As opposed to the ECPA, the SCA governs communications once
they are received and stored, whether in a user's inbox or in other
document storage.48 Within 18o days of transmission, a warrant is
required to allow the government access to the communications;
however, after 18o days have passed, law enforcement officials simply
need a subpoena or court order, which merely requires a showing of
probable cause. 49 Whether a communication is in transmission or has
been received, pinpointing the instant at which a communication
becomes "stored" is an important issue due to the much higher
standards governing the disclosure of communications under the
ECPA.50
The SCA applies to service providers as parties in civil litigation, as
well as to non-parties, disallowing disclosure of electronic
communication in their possession.51 In general, the SCA prohibits
electronic communications services, which enable the sending of
messages between users, from knowingly divulging information
without the user's permission. Under the exceptions of the Stored
Communications Act, electronic communications services may
voluntarily divulge the contents of online communications if "lawful
consent" is given by the account holder-whether he or she is the
sender or recipient of the communication.52 Like the ECPA, the SCA
only requires the consent of one party for disclosure of a
communication to be lawful.
Issuing subpoenas to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) presents an
additional question for the courts and legislature. If a party seeks
information that falls under the statutory authority of the SCA, the
party seeking admission must first ascertain who has control over the
communication-whether it is a party to the proceeding or a third
47 Id.
48 Matlach, supra note 14, at 448-49.
49 Scolnik, supra note 12, at 382-93; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2oo8).
50 Matlach, supra note 14, at 449; see also Salter, supra note 16, at 368.
51 Ackermann, supra note 41, at 42.
52 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2oo8); see also Ackermann, supra note 41, at 43.
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party-and then petition the court to compel disclosure or consent.53
While the issue has not been decided definitively, several courts have
quashed subpoenas to ISPs seeking the release of electronic
communications.54 This is not the case, however, when the subpoena
is directed to the person who controls the information; under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 34, when discovery is directed to a sender,
recipient, addressee, or subscriber who exercises control over the
communications, such communication is subject to discovery.55
Further, in Flagg v. City of Detroit, the court not only held that a
court has the ability to order a person to produce documents, but that
it can order that person to give consent so someone else can disclose
documents and communications on their behalf56 Further, courts
may seek disclosure of information from whoever controls the
communication, even if that person is not a party in the proceeding.57
However, just because the court possesses the power to compel
consent does not mean it must always exercise such power upon
request. Rather, a court must weigh the communication's value
against privacy considerations.58
When seeking evidence from Facebook, the "third party" is often
Facebook itself. Since all material posted on the website is accessible
by the company, the party seeking admission must simply petition the
court to compel consent or disclosure from Facebook.59 While this is
an easy and direct course to the information, what are the costs
associated with such free access? The next section examines current
53 Ackermann, supra note 41, at 46.
54 See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F.Supp.2d 606 (E.D. Va.
2008); Hone v. Presidente U.S.A. Inc., No 5-o8-MC-80071-JF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55722 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2oo8)(unpublished); J.T. Shannon Lumber Co v. Gilco Lumber
Inc., No. 2-07-cv-119, 2008 WL 3833216 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 14, 2oo8), reconsideration
denied, 2008 WL 4755370 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 29, 2008).
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).
56 Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
57 Thomas v. Deloitte Consulting LP, No. 3-02-cv-0343-M, 2004 WL 1372954, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. June 14, 2004).
58 In re J.T. Shannon Lumber Co., No. 2-07-cv-119, 2008 WL 4755370, at *1 (N.D. Miss.
Oct. 29, 2008).
59 Facebook's Terms of Service even explicitly state to users that they will comply with
legitimate law enforcement requests for information. FACEBOOK DATA USE POLICY,
http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/other (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
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jurisprudence, focusing on the areas of law that have seen the greatest
advancement in the use of social media E-evidence.
III. CURRENT E-EVIDENCE JURISPRUDENCE
While every area of law may soon see social media introduced into
the courtroom, there are several practice areas that have encountered
this issue the most in recent years. Since 2008, federal judges have
issued more than two dozen search warrants granting access to
individuals' private Facebook profiles, and the trend is increasing. In
fact, 2011 saw more than double the number of search warrants
granted than in 2010.60 Where courts have allowed evidence from
Facebook, generally it has been evaluated on a case-by-case basis,
with judges carefully weighing the benefits and allowing only that
which is probative and relevant to the outcome of the case.61 As such,
it is beneficial to understand how information from Facebook is being
used in these areas and how the bench is coming to understand this
novel type of evidence.
A. INSURANCE AND PERSONAL INJURY CASES
In tort cases involving insurance and personal injury, introduction
of material from Facebook is often used to combat claims of serious
injury. Typical examples of this type of use include insurance
companies seeking to admit evidence from an allegedly injured
plaintiffs page that illustrates an active, happy life.
In Romano v. Steelcase, the Suffolk County Supreme Court in New
York allowed evidence from Facebook to disprove the plaintiffs claims
that her injuries resulted in a serious loss of enjoyment of life.62 While
60 Jeff J. Rogers, A New Law-Enforcement Tool: Facebook Searches, THOMPSON REUTERS
(July 12, 201i), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2o11/07-
_July/A new law-enforcementtoolFacebooksearches.
61 See, e.g., Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)
62 Id. at 651. While Romano is not the most recent case, it has set the precedent of allowing
such breadth of information. A subsequent case has followed Romano's example, granting
a motion to compel evidence from social media sites where there is a high chance of
relevant information and the plaintiff puts his or her personal condition at issue. See
Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc., No. cv-09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410, at *6 (Pa. Com. P1.
2011). The Zimmerman court did add, however, "fishing expeditions will not be allowed,"
only compelling access when non-private information suggests relevant information
resides on the private page. Id. at *6 n.8.
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Romano is a lower court decision, the case received media attention
because of the unprecedented breadth and type of information
allowed.6 3 The defendant sought information from the plaintiffs
current and historical Facebook and MySpace pages-including
private and deleted material-which was postulated to contain
information relating to the extent of the plaintiffs injuries. Notably,
the defendant contended that the plaintiffs Facebook and MySpace
pages contained images of her on vacation and engaging in an active
lifestyle. The plaintiff had previously claimed such activities were
unfeasible due to her injuries, which had allegedly confined her to her
house and bed.64 After viewing the public postings on the plaintiffs
social media pages, the court stated that there was a high likelihood
that highly relevant material would be found on her private pages and
may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 65
The Romano court used a test of "usefulness and reason" for the
information requested, but stated that public policy weighs heavily in
favor of open disclosure.66 Significantly, the court noted that
"[p]laintiffs who place their physical condition in controversy, may
not shield from disclosure material which is necessary to the defense
of the action,"67 thus permitting discovery of materials relevant both
to the extent of the injuries and damages. Denying the defendant
access to the pages, the court noted, would only "condone Plaintiffs
attempt to hide relevant information behind self-regulated privacy
settings."68 The court also stated that the production of information
from Facebook and MySpace was not violative of the plaintiffs
privacy, and that any such concerns are outweighed by the need for
the information. 69 Indeed, the court cited the very nature of social
networking websites-designed to share personal information with
63 Andrew S. Kaufman, The Social Network in Personal Injury Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15,
2OLO, at 1-2, available at http://kbrlaw.com/kaufman6.pdf.
64 Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
65 Id. at 655.
66 Id. at 652.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 655.
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one's social network-as evidence of the lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy.7O
Other personal injury cases follow similar fact patterns to that in
Romano. In Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court denied the
plaintiffs motion for a protective order on information from
Facebook, MySpace, and other social media sites, finding that such
information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
relevant and admissible evidence.71 The defendant sought the
information to disprove the plaintiffs injury claims and his wife's loss
of consortium claims. Additionally, the court stated that by injecting
the issue of the relationship between herself and the plaintiff into the
courtroom, co-plaintiff Disa Powell waived any spousal privileges she
may have had.72
Foreign courts have established more concrete discovery
procedures pertaining to social media. For example, in Leduc v.
Roman, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice affirmed a lower court
holding that postings on the plaintiffs Facebook profile were
documents within the meaning of the Rules of Civil Procedure and
therefore must be produced if relevant to the action at issue.73 Leduc
commenced the action after a motor vehicle accident, asking for
damages for loss of enjoyment of life; however, images and postings
on the plaintiffs Facebook showed him fishing and enjoying other
physical activities. Thus, the court concluded that Leduc had an
obligation to produce any relevant documents, including information
from Facebook.74 As evidenced in the above cases, the social nature of
Facebook and related sites can contain a treasure trove of information
regarding a plaintiffs injuries, or lack thereof, leading judges to often
allow such evidence into trial.
B. DIVORCE AND CUSTODY CASES
In family law cases, social media evidence is often requested as
proof of a party's character or fault in the matter, including evidence
70 Id. at 657.
71 Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. o6-cv-o1958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL 1067018, at
*i (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009).
72 Id.




of extramarital affairs and engagement in activities that would
adversely affect the best interests of a child. While it is not uncommon
for parties to introduce evidence of their opponent's character flaws in
order to gain a favorable divorce settlement or custody agreement,
taking such evidence from social media sites is not directly analogous
to more conventional forms of evidence.
Individuals who have everyday access to a party's Facebook
account generally are allowed to use such information in court; since
the parties are "friends," there is no expectation of privacy between
them. However, due to the embattled nature of many family law
proceedings, it is common for estranged spouses to "unfriend" each
other-disallowing access to the page if privacy settings dictate as
such. Though it has been established that, absent password
protection, information on a shared spousal computer does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy,75 the quasi-private nature of
Facebook complicates matters. Despite this, courts are increasingly
inclined towards admitting E-evidence from Facebook in family law
cases, favoring open disclosure over any possible privacy concerns.
In Dexter, II v. Dexter, an Ohio Court of Appeals custody case, the
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its grant
of custody, which was based in part on the mother's MySpace profile.76
The mother contended that the trial court erred in considering her
religion, lifestyle choices, and other information from her profile,
absent any evidence that such matters adversely affected the child.77
In her public MySpace blog, the mother had written about her sado-
masochism, bisexuality, and paganism. The trial court allowed this
evidence and concluded from the evidence that such personal choices
would have an effect on her child. Courts in similar cases have also
chosen to allow evidence from social media to determine parental
fitness or settle divorce proceedings, deeming such information
relevant in determining a litigant's character and permitting it to
influence the outcomes of such cases.78
75 Camille Calman, Spy vs. Spouse: Regulating Surveillance Software on Shared Marital
Computers, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 2097, 2098 (2005).
76 Dexter, II v. Dexter, No. 20o6-p-0051, 2007 WL 1532084, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
77Id. at *4.
78 See also, B.M. v. D.M., 927 N.Y.S.2d 814, at -5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (where the court
allowed evidence from the wife's blog and Facebook about her belly dancing in a divorce
proceeding); In re T.T., 228 S.W.3d 312, 322-23 (Tex. App. 2007) (court allowed evidence
from MySpace in a case involving termination of parental rights).
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C. CRIMINAL CASES
Criminal courts and police departments have also begun to utilize
information from Facebook and other social media sites to gather
information and to prosecute criminals. Indeed, some criminals have
been foolish enough to brag about their illegal acts via Facebook, as in
the case of a recent burglar who not only uploaded pictures of himself
with his stolen spoils onto his Facebook page, but then also "friended"
the man that he burgled (and was promptly thereafter arrested).79
While it is possible that social media can serve directly as evidence
of the crime at trial, it is more often the case that such evidence is used
to illustrate a defendant's character and lifestyles ° Law enforcement
officers are able to see any publicly posted photographs and use them
either as supplemental information about a party or even as evidence
that a crime was committed. 81 While most (though probably not all)
criminals would be surreptitious enough to resist posting updates or
pictures of an assault or robbery, lesser crimes, such as underage
drinking or driving under the influence, are more commonly shared
online. This is especially the case for Facebook because of its largely
young user base; college students upload photographs from late
Saturday nights without considering the consequences, which can be
harsh.82
A now-infamous example of the use of such postings happened
after a Pennsylvania State University football game in October 2005.
Photographs taken at a post-game riot soon turned up on Facebook,
which the police then used to identify and cite about fifty students.83
Similarly, in 2007, evidence from Facebook was used by the
University of Connecticut Police to link a driver to a hit and run
incident. 84 Additionally, prosecutors have used E-evidence in drunk
79 Gabe Acevedo, World's Dumbest Criminal Would Like to Add You as a 'Friend', ABOVE
THE LAW (Mar. 11, 2o11), http://abovethelaw.com/2O11/03/worlds-dumbest-criminal-
would-like-to-add-you-as-a-friend.
80 Daniel Findlay, Tag! Now You're Really "It" What Photographs on Social Networking
Sites Mean for the Fourth Amendment, lo N.C. J. L. & TECH. 171, 171 (2008).
81 Id. at 176-79.
82 Id. at 171-72.
83 Matthew J. Hodge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the "New"
Internet: Facebook.com and Myspace.com, 31 S. ILL. U.L.J. 95, 95 (2oo6).
84 Edward M. Marsico, Jr., Social Networking Websites: Are Myspace and Facebook the
Fingerprints of the Twenty-First Century?, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 967, 969-70 (2010).
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driving trials, showing photographs of defendants in an embarrassing
light-evidence that such defendants habitually engage in
irresponsible behavior or are unrepentant since their D.U.I. arrest.85
Evidence from Twitter and Myspace has also been used by police
to gather information about gang activity.86 Suspects who cannot
resist bragging online about their latest gun purchase or extortion end
up aiding police and district attorneys in their own prosecutions. 87
Using photos of gang symbols or weapons on Facebook and Myspace
pages, law enforcement officials have been able to identify and gather
information about potential suspects. 88
Other issues arise when evidence from Facebook is used in
criminal cases. Unless the information is publicly available, under the
Stored Communications Act the State will likely need to serve
Facebook itself with legal process in order to obtain the information. 89
This, by itself, does not present a large hurdle for the prosecution.
Questions do arise, however, concerning whether the defendant has
the same ease of access to social media information. While criminal
defendants do have access to any messages sent to or by them
personally, they may not be able to obtain access to alleged victims'
profiles and deleted material, and may therefore lose an opportunity
for a defense.9o Additionally, while governmental entities are granted
an exception to the blanket protections of the Stored Communications
Act, defendants do not have that benefit.91 It thus becomes a question
of fairness as to whether criminal defendants should have the same
reasonable access to social media information that is afforded to the
prosecution.
85 Findlay, supra note 8o, at 178.
86 Marsico, supra note 84, at 970.
87 Id. at 972. This is most often the case with career criminals, who take pride in their
criminal activities and are therefore the most likely to post about them online. Id.
88 Id.
89 Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 43, at 580.
90 Id. at 385.
91 Id. at 590-91; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2008).
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D. VOIR DIRE AND OTHER JURY CONSIDERATIONS
The latest way that attorneys are using social media to further
their clients' interests is through jury selection; Facebook and other
social media sites are valuable in the determination of which potential
jurors are most favorable to a litigant's case.92 While tangential to the
direct issue of E-evidence admissibility, this emerging area is proving
to be ripe with issues of its own. If used free from any deceit, potential
jurors' online profiles can offer a host of information which may prove
quite significant in determining the jurors with the "right"
characteristics for a particular case-especially since some of the
information may contain information about subjects disallowed from
voir dire questioning. Attorneys and jury experts look at such profile
details as: favorite television programs, which may indicate a bias,
especially if those shows are crime-related; number of friends, which
may indicate an ability to be swayed; and rants or especially strong-
opinioned Tweets, which can suggest that such a person might
dominate jury deliberations, or may even run the risk of posting
information from the case and causing a mistrial.93 Social media is
especially useful in the jury selection context because parties usually
have limited time to question potential jurors, in addition to the
candid nature of some posts-a quality not often found in juror
questioning. However, this area of use is not without controversy.
Privacy experts argue that using social networks to investigate private
citizens is invasive, and some experts also argue that it may grant
unfair advantage to those with resources to bring in the required
equipment. Additionally, scholars question the veracity of online
profiles to begin with.94 Even more controversial is the proposition of
granting potential jurors free wireless Internet access during their
time at the courthouse if they agree to give the lawyers access to their
private Facebook accounts (which is generally met with apprehension
from the jury pool).95 Despite the seemingly lax restrictions on such
92 Ana Campoy & Ashby Jones, Searching for Details Online, Lawyers Facebook the Jury,




95 Id. Such access would be granted through temporarily "friending" a certain legal office.
Jurors found this practice invasive, not seeing the reward of temporary Internet access
attractive enough to allow the litigators to invade their private lives. Id.
1Vol. 7:3
GLADYSZ
use of social networking sites, this is one area that may soon be
regulated and followed more closely by ethics committees. Until then,
it remains an ethically ambiguous-yet perfectly legal-tool at a
litigator's disposal to sway the outcome of the case favorably for his or
her client.
Further, courts are beginning to limit jurors' use of Facebook
inside and outside the courtroom. Some jurisdictions are adding
policies and specialized rules to jury instructions about the use of
social media and other Internet tools for independent research on the
players of their trial. As far-fetched as this may seem, instances of
jurors polling their Facebook friends on which way to vote, "friending"
parties in the proceeding, or blogging about jury deliberations have
made such measures necessary.96 Some states, such as Michigan, New
York, Oregon, Texas, and Alaska, have baned jurors from bringing
their cellular phones into the courtroom or jury deliberations in
reaction to several instances where jurors were Tweeting during the
trial.97 Other states have added sections to their jury instructions
explicitly explaining that Googling or otherwise searching online for
parties to the proceeding is not allowed.98 Courts across the nation
have begun to examine the promulgation of new rules individually,
but the trend in restricting use in order to avoid improper Internet
communications-and possibly a mistrial-is becoming stronger
throughout the country and will most likely become more prevalent in
coming years.
IV. REALMS OF PRIVACY IN THE FAR REACHES 01- CYBERSPACE
In addition to statutory protections-or lack thereof- promulgated
by Congress, important doctrines have emerged from common law
jurisprudence and privacy policy that have affected and continue to
shape the legal conversation concerning social media E-evidence. This
section explores such over-arching doctrines, applying them by
example to relevant Facebook communications.
96 See Sharon Nelson, John Simek & Jason Fotlin, The Legal Implications of Social
Networking, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010); see also Eva-Marie Ayala, Tarrant County
Juror Sentenced to Community Service for Trying to 'Friend' Defendant on Facebook,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.star-telegram.com/2o11/o8/
28/3319796/juror-sentenced-to-community-service.html.
97 Nelson, Simek & Foltin, supra note 96, at 5-6.
98 Id. at 6-7.
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A. KATZ'S LEGACY
The case of Katz v. United States has become a landmark opinion
in the area of privacy law, still affecting the way the Supreme Court
views the Fourth Amendment more than forty years after it was
decided.99 The issue in Katz concerned the legality of government
wiretaps of a suspected criminal's phone conversations, which were
introduced as evidence against the defendant Katz at trial.10o The
taped phone conversations took place in a public phone booth, where
the surveillance by law enforcement officers was of limited scope and
duration, and provided evidence of Katz's illegal gambling.1o1
Nevertheless, the Court held that invasion of a constitutionally
protected area without a search warrant is presumptively
unreasonable, and therefore this wiretap was unconstitutional.102 In
so holding, the Court noted that Fourth Amendment "considerations
do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the
setting of a home... Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know
that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures."l3
While the majority holding in this case is undoubtedly
constitutionally significant, it is Justice Harlan's concurrence that has
made an indelible mark on privacy law and the interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment.104 Providing the analysis that the Court still uses
today, Harlan established a two-pronged test to determine whether
the Fourth Amendment protects certain information. For a person to
have a reasonable expectation of privacy necessary to garner Fourth
Amendment protection: (1) the person must "have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy";1°5 and (2) "the expectation [must]
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'106 Under
this test, conversations held in a private home would be considered
99 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).
loo Id. at 348.
lo, Id. at 354.
102 Id. at 359.
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., Scolnik, supra note 12, at 364.




protected by the Fourth Amendment, while those that occur loudly in
public do not carry the same expectations of privacy and therefore are
afforded less protection.
Additionally, both the majority and Harlan's concurrence
recognized the role of technologies in privacy law (though the
technologies of 1967 were certainly quite different than those of
today), with Justice Harlan stating that "electronic as well as physical
intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment."1°7
Katz affirmed that when individuals voluntarily divulge
information to the public, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy.1° 8 In most cases, the distinction between public and private is
relatively easy to discern; however, in the case of social media, with
privacy controls and users who do not fully comprehend how the
networks function, categorizing what communications are open to the
"public" and which are truly private becomes a complicated issue.
B. THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
Third-party doctrine is a premise developed upon the theories
articulated in Katz and subsequent jurisprudence.109 While its legacy
is not as strongly felt as that of the other principles discussed in this
Note, the vestiges of the third-party doctrine nonetheless have an
influence on privacy law today. The doctrine postulates that if the
information in question has been voluntarily turned over to a third
party, the individual seeking privacy protection no longer has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.11° For example, in Hoffa v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that information given to third parties
or stored on third-party databases no longer contains the reasonable
expectation of privacy necessary to obtain full Fourth Amendment
protection.111 The conversation at issue took place between two
individuals, but was held in the presence of a third-party outsider. The
107 Id. at 360.
io8 Scolnik, supra note 12, at 354.
109 Id.
110 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563
(2009).
"I Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (stating that conversations shared
with a third party could no longer receive Fourth Amendment protections).
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Court thus allowed the subpoena of the third party who bore witness
to the conversation; however, it also stated that a party does not
forfeit all Fourth Amendment rights upon the sharing of information
to a third party, but rather merely shifts the balance slightly more
toward disclosure.112
The third parties of today are no longer simply other persons
present in the room or on another line listening in on a phone
conversation; electronic databases are also being used to diminish
privacy privileges under the third-party doctrine. The Supreme Court
has held that information stored by a third-party, where the third-
party has access to the information, is afforded no privacy protections
under the Fourth Amendment."3
Similarly, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) often maintain
databases of users' information, including private emails, which are
stored on ISP servers." 4 If courts were to take an expansive view of the
third-party doctrine, this is another avenue by which to access
otherwise privacy-protected communications located on social media
website servers."5 For, as stated by the Court, the Fourth Amendment
does not "protect[] a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.116
C. THE LEVELS OF PRIVACY
As stated in Katz, an individual using a phone booth is "entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world.""7 While this may almost always be the case
with telephone conversations, there are Internet locations that enjoy
these assumptions as well. While some Internet communications may
be presumed public, others have privacy controls that garner them
more protection."18 This section examines the three levels of privacy,
112 Id. at 301-03.
113 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (holding that bank records held by a
third-party bank were not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
114 Scolnik, supra note 12, at 359.
115 Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 43, at 575-76.
n6 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
117 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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and applies them in terms of today's most significant social
networking website: Facebook.
1. PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS
Public communications are those that, because they are shared
openly, are not shielded by a constitutionally-protected expectation of
privacy.119 In the early days of social media, courts were generally very
willing to allow E-evidence into the courtroom without pause for
several reasons, which are still advanced by some courts and scholars
today.12o First, courts are hesitant to give protection to parties who
choose to disclose the information in controversy online.121 Second,
most courts favor the production of relevant evidence over
consideration of an individual's privacy interests.122 Finally, some
courts find reasonable expectation of privacy considerations absent
from social media postings.123
Today, public communications include any text or media that is
available to the general public.124 Examples of public communications
include radio broadcasts125 websites, and open blog posts.'2 6 Under
these standards, social networking communications are unequivocally
unshielded by the Fourth Amendment if they are free from any
privacy protections that may be available for individual websites. By
118 Evan E. North, Note, Facebook Isn't Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social
Networking Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1288 (2010).
119 Matlach, supra note 14, at 459.
120 Payne, supra note 3, at 86o-61.
121 Id. at 861; see also Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, at *1.
122 See, e.g., Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1O67018, at *2.
123 Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
124 North, supra note 118, at 1288.
125 See, e.g., Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La. 1986), affd, 8o8 F.2d
54 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
communications broadcast over the radio that can be overheard by countless people).
126 See, e.g., United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002) (stating
that privacy protection is unavailable to a person who undertakes no measures to protect
the information and that a person who places a photograph online and unsecured by
privacy controls forfeits any Fourth Amendment protection).
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this logic, the user, having taken no steps to guard his or her
communications, has no reasonable expectation of privacy. If a social
media user's profile is available to anyone on the Internet, or even
simply to every registered user of a particular social networking
website, the current standard holds this data as a public
communication.127
Applying the principles of public communications to Facebook, it
is clear that those profiles or parts of profiles that are open to anyone
with an account-or anyone with a familiarity with Google-are
considered public communications and thus are freely discoverable. A
user can have a completely public profile, but privacy controls also let
the user make certain sections of their profile private and others
public. For example, a user may control who can view their "wall" and
photos, but allow anyone to see their basic information. If this is the
case, the contents of the profile are split between those public
communications and the privacy-controlled sections, which would fall
into one of the two categories discussed below.
2. PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
Private communications are those that, both subjectively and
objectively, are viewed as being only accessible by a very limited
number of people. These communications are afforded the highest
level of protections allowed by the Fourth Amendment, denying law
enforcement access to such information.
Examples of such private communications include a phone call
between two or an otherwise small number of individuals,128 instant
messaging, emailing, and other communications between individuals
that are not intentionally open to the public. While there are always
chances that an email will be sent to someone unintentionally or
instant messages will become unencrypted, the parties to the
conversation still hold a subjectively and objectively reasonable belief
that they are private and act in confidence of this. Thus, the
communication receives full Fourth Amendment protections.
Analogizing these principles to Facebook, private communications
would be those kept between a small number of people, such as the
use of Facebook messaging-an email equivalent between friends-or
127 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1967) (holding that information provided
freely to others confers no reasonable expectation of privacy); see also Matlach, supra note
14, at 460.
128 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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Facebook chat-an instant messaging service.129 These types of
communications are not intentionally exposed to the public and are
similar to any other form of closed communications, such as a phone
call, email, or other types of instant messaging services.130 Because of
the expectations that these conversations will remain private, they
should carry the same protections as phone calls and similar
communications. Such private Facebook communications, therefore,
should earn full Fourth Amendment protections.
3. QUASI-PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
The nature of quasi-private communications, which straddle the
divide between public and private, makes this category the most
difficult to define concretely. Generally, these communications would
otherwise be considered public, but are utilized in a way that attaches
a reasonable expectation of privacy to their use.131
Because of such expectations, lawmakers and courts should grant
these communications some protection under the Fourth Amendment
and privacy statutes. The exact level of protection afforded would
depend on several factors, including the type of information, steps
taken by the user to shelter the information from the public, and the
individual website's privacy policies. A fact inquiry is often necessary
to ascertain just how reasonable a user's expectation of privacy may
be.132 However, because a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, a
warrant or court order (as required by the SCA) should be required for
law enforcement to gain access to the material.
A good portion of social networking communications fall under
this category due to the amalgamation of both large networks of
people granted access to the information and the user's own
(reasonable) view of her information as guarded from the public. An
example of this is information on a Facebook user's profile, if such
information is protected by the website's available privacy controls.
Because of such controls, the user often views this information as
closed off to the "public" at large, regardless of how many friends he
129 See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
130 Matlach, supra note 14, at 461.
131 Id. at 460.
132 Id.
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or she might have that are allowed to see the information. 133 However,
the current "objective" test of reasonability views this information as
public because of the potentially large amount of people who are still
able to view the information (including people the user might not
know well). 134
Application of this principle to social networking communications
can be analogized to simple face-to-face conversations: A conversation
between a small group of close friends is likely to be considered
private, but if such a conversation was held in a large, filled lecture
hall that would most likely not be the case.135 Put another way, private
information that is shared with strangers happened upon is no longer
private;136 but if such information is shared merely with close
confidants, there is an expectation that it will not be repeated
publically.137
Herein lies a divide in understanding: While lawmakers and courts
generally argue that quasi-private communications are discoverable,
the average user regards these communications as private. Because of
the divergence, the law should err on protecting the privacy rights of
individuals absent other prevailing interests.
In terms of Facebook communications, quasi-private
communications are those posts that are hidden to the general public
through the use of privacy controls, but are still open to certain
networks or large groups of people. Additionally, because of the
nature of Facebook, even communications shared only with "friends"
have the chance of being copied and shared with larger networks of
people-disseminating information without user consent-and they
are thus deemed less worthy of Fourth Amendment protection. 138
Because of the vast number of controls available, defining a
specific location along the public-private spectrum for all quasi-
private communications simply is not a workable proposal. Instead, in
determining where along the spectrum certain communications lie,
there are several factors to look at, individual to each post or
133 North, supra note 118, at 1296.
134 Id.
135 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1967).
136 Id.
137 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
138 North, supra note 118, at 1288, 1296.
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communication. Factors may include, but are not limited to: the
amount of friends a user has (and are thus allowed to view certain
information), how privacy controls are used (whether access is limited
to a "network," "friends of friends," just "friends," or an even smaller
number though the utilization of customizable "friend groups"), and
similar considerations.139
By limiting access to selected content, the user logically believes
she has protected herself. If a user has gone through the necessary
steps to reasonably protect her information, this should place such
communications nearer to private communication on the spectrum,
and thus allow the information greater Fourth Amendment
considerations.
V. ANALYSIS
The current state of disconnect between those communications
that users view as reasonably private and those that courts view as
reasonably private is disconcerting. Many users are not aware of how
little protection they have, and are thus unable to protect themselves.
Further, given the current popularity and power of social networks, it
is simply unreasonable to suggest that users significantly alter or
altogether stop using these websites for fear that Big Brother is
watching. Instead, lawmakers must be willing to change with the
times and realize further protections for users of social media are
necessary.
It is my proposition that courts alter their consideration on
whether quasi-private communications, as defined above, should be
discoverable. Instead of presuming that such communications are
admissible absent other interests or issues, current statutes governing
the discoverability of social media evidence need to be amended and
viewed from a new perspective: Rather than presuming such evidence
is discoverable unless proven otherwise, this quasi-private
information should not be regarded as discoverable unless the moving
party can prove prevailing interests under which to admit the
evidence.
While at times this type of evidence may have high probative
value, for example, proving a fact in dispute or an alibi, much of the
potential character or circumstantial evidence is taken out of context
and contains great risk of being overly prejudicial or confusing. Due to
the nature of such information contained on social media websites, a
139 Id. at 1298.
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vast majority of this information should be disallowed from the
courtroom.
In their analysis of a reasonable expectation of privacy on social
networks, courts fail to consider some of the more complicated issues
that plague networks such as Facebook. For example, Facebook has
not always existed in its current state. At its advent, Facebook was
available only to college students. At that time, students posted
information freely and this information was usually available only to
others in the user's "network"-other students on their campus.
Neither these users nor Facebook's executives themselves could have
predicted such rapid and extensive evolution into the multi-
platformed network with 750 million users that exists today. This
change is not only a technical marvel, but a privacy concern. Courts
consider reasonable expectations of privacy under standards of today,
not by what kind of network existed when the information was posted.
While it is true that less recent posts are inherently less probative and
thus less likely to be admitted into evidence, the concern exists
nevertheless. No matter when the information was posted, it is stored
on Facebook's servers and is discoverable under today's legal
landscape without sight of what privacy rights are given up.
Privacy policy dictates the use of discretion in allowing evidence
believed by the user and deemed by the website to be private to be
subpoenaed. Unless this information is highly probative and essential
to the case at hand, courts should err on the side of caution before
admitting the evidence, in keeping with the Fourth Amendment.
There are certain circumstances where such character evidence should
be admitted into the courtroom, such as instances when the party's
character or reputation are elements of the crime itself. An example of
this would be the use of social media evidence in a child custody
hearing. In this instance, admitting pictures of a parent engaging in
irresponsible behavior found on a social media site-such as drinking,
drug use, or other risky behaviors-may be highly probative in
determining whether the individual is capable of being a fit parent. If
information contained in a "private" page proves a fact of the matter
in consequence, the court may well find that interests lie on the side of
disclosure.
Additionally, other circumstances or considerations may prove to
tip the scale in favor of allowing such quasi-private communications.
If the information cannot-or at least cannot without significant cost
or burden-be found elsewhere, in the interests of justice, the
information should be discoverable. Further, there may be times when
the specific fact that information was posted online becomes
significant. For example, in a criminal juvenile case, the prosecution
may want to admit online posts to prove that the defendant is
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unrepentant in his actions. Because of the specific value of this
information being online, it proves to be valuable enough to forgo the
privacy considerations in question.
However, the nature of social media sites calls into question the
value of such information, for several reasons. For one, information
about a party may have been posted by another user, proving it very
difficult to control this information or even know that it is online in
the first place. Additionally, not all images or posts can or should be
taken at face value and the court should carefully examine both the
probative value and veracity of the information in its evaluation of
such evidence. Factors in determining whether such evidence is
probative enough to be admitted include how recent such evidence is
and the context of any text or photograph.
Due to the ubiquity of social media websites-deemed the
"permanent chronicle of people's lives" by one privacy scholar'4°-the
use of such sites in obtaining potential evidence may prove to be
easiest avenue to certain types of information. However, because of
the above concerns, courts should only allow evidence taken from
social media websites if such information is not available elsewhere.
Such a measure allows important evidence to be admitted over any
privacy concerns only if the information is necessary and otherwise
unavailable, taking heed of Fourth Amendment concerns.
Social media sites encourage users to share personal
information, 141 but that does not and should not mean that the use of
social media causes users to relinquish their Fourth Amendment and
other privacy rights. These websites encourage users to start a
conversation, to share aspects of themselves, and to use the site as a
tool with which to interact with friends.142 When one sends a letter to a
friend, she has every reason to believe the post office will respect her
privacy; the letter writer has not consented to having the contents of
such a letter turned over to the police. So why would this expectation
be any different for a Facebook user who sends his friend a message or
post that he believes is private? The law should evolve along with new
media and protect user privacy in a new era. While courts may be
hesitant to read these privacy rights into current precedent and
statutory material, the legislature is in a prime position to promulgate
140 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 11 (2007).
141 North, supra note 118, at 1288.
142 Id. at 1280.
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new laws in order to fully protect users' rights. It may be true that
social media is evolving too rapidly for the courts or legislature to keep
up with specific laws, but in order to protect individuals' Fourth
Amendment rights, it is important to disseminate new statutes and
common law that allows for flexibility to grant protection when users
truly and understandably believe information they post online is
private.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid evolution of the Internet and social media has presented
the courts and legislatures of our country with the task of reforming
United States legal doctrine in keeping with the times. Despite certain
efforts in the statutory and common law, the infamously slow-to-
change U.S. legal system has yet to fully conform to the new
Facebook-centric era. This disparity between the growth of technology
and legal theory has shown itself most tellingly in the disconnect
between objective and subjective expectations of privacy. While
younger generations believe that material posted online is private,
older generations of lawmakers and judiciary see such information as
open to the masses, and therefore public-and, for better or worse, the
latter are those whose voices are most strongly heard. Users,
reasonably expecting their online communications to be shielded from
the courts, deserve to have their privacy rights recognized by the
legislature and court system.
Amidst all of this commotion concerning what privacy is expected
of one's Facebook status updates, the Fourth Amendment has been
subdued. In order to guarantee Fourth Amendment rights in future
generations, privacy rights online must be recognized. There are, of
course, certain circumstances that call for the discovery and
admission of social media evidence in litigation, but this should be an
exception, not the rule. In order to encourage faith in the judiciary and
legislature from the new generation of Americans who live their lives
online, protection of their Internet identities is crucial. If we do not
protect privacy interests now, the future of those liberties guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment are in danger of being silenced forever.
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